Executable-Icon-Location

Carefully manage destination buffer size

Sean Barnum, Cigital, Inc. [vita¹]

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Part "Original Cigital Coding Rule in XML"

Mime-type: text/xml, size: 5382 bytes

Attack Category	 Malicious Input Path spoofing or confusion problem		
Vulnerability Category	 Buffer Overflow Input source (not really attack) Unconditional 		
Software Context	Shell FunctionsFile Management		
Location	• shellapi.h		
Description	When calling functions for locating files and icons, the destination string buffer must be long enough to hold the return file path. Otherwise, buffer overflows will occur.		
APIs	Function Name Comments		
	ExtractAssociatedIcon lpIconPath [in/out], read from file		
	ExtractAssociatedIconA lpIconPath [in/out], read from file		
	ExtractAssociatedIconEx Second param: lpIconPath		
	ExtractAssociatedIconExASecond param: lpIconPath		
	ExtractAssociatedIconEx VSecond param: lpIconPath		
	ExtractAssociatedIconW lpIconPath [in/out], read from file		
	FindExecutable Last parameter: lpResult		
	FindExecutableA Last parameter: lpResult		
	FindExecutableW Last parameter: lpResult		
	AssocQueryString Second to last parameter: pszOut		

 $^{1. \}quad http://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/about_us/authors/35-BSI.html~(Barnum, Sean)\\$

Method of Attack	These routines are all subject to buffer overflows. If the attacker provides a long path name, it could overflow a buffer that is not at least MAX_PATH characters in length.		
Exception Criteria			
Solutions	Solution Applicability	Solution Description	Solution Efficacy
	When any of the indicated functions is called.	The specified parameter must be at least MAX_PATH characters in length to ensure that it is large enough to hold the returned string. Otherwise, a buffer overflow can occur. [Actually, the documentation does not specify the maximum size for lpIconPath, but we assume MAX_PATH as it is the maximum length of an ASCII file path in Windows. Note that when Unicode is in use, some functions allow paths far larger than MAX_PATH, provided they begin with the special sequence "\\?\". Check documentation to determine whether your code needs to allow for this possibility.]	Effective, subject to issue of Unicode paths that may exceed MAX_PATH characters in length.

Signature Details	Any of the indicated functions is called.		
Examples of Incorrect Code	TCHAR lpResult[20]; // Buffer is too small		
	<pre>// Note: FindExecutable is, strangely, for finding files but not for finding executables HINSTANCE instance = FindExecutable(TEXT("MyFile.txt"), TEXT("C:\\MyDirectory"), LPTSTR lpResult);</pre>		
Examples of Corrected Code	TCHAR lpResult[MAX_PATH]; // Buffer is correctly sized // Note: FindExecutable is, strangely, for finding files but		
	<pre>not for finding executables HINSTANCE instance = FindExecutable(TEXT("MyFile.txt"), TEXT("C:\\MyDirectory"), LPTSTR lpResult);</pre>		
Source Reference	http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp? url=/library/en-us/shellcc/platform/shell/reference/ functions/findexecutable.asp ²		
Recommended Resource			
Discriminant Set	Operating System • Windows		
	Languages • C		
	• C++		

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mailto:copyright@cigital.com